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The Digitization of Section 8 of the
Charter: Reform or Revolution?
Steven Penney*

I. INTRODUCTION
Police have conducted searches and seizures of computers and other
digital devices1 for some time.2 But the ubiquity, portability, connectivity,
and processing and storage capacities of contemporary devices3 present new
challenges to the law of search and seizure, including the interpretation and
application of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
which guarantees everyone’s “right to be secure against unreasonable search
or seizure”.4
For some, digitization is a grave threat to the socio-legal order. Law
enforcement officials complain that criminals’ use of technology has
outstripped the investigative capacity of police and plea for legislators
and judges to restore the pre-digital status quo.5 Privacy advocates also

*

Faculty of Law, University of Alberta.
The terms “computer” and “digital device” are used interchangeably in this paper. In the
Criminal Code, a “computer system” is defined for various purposes as “a device that, or a group of
interconnected or related devices one or more of which, (a) contains computer programs or other
data, and (b) pursuant to computer programs, (i) performs logic and control, and (ii) may perform
any other function”. This definition would seem to encompass virtually any digital device, including
desktop, laptop, and tablet computers, mobile phones, and related technologies. Criminal Code,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 342.1(2).
2
See, e.g., R. v. DeCoste, [1983] N.S.J. No. 516, 60 N.S.R. (2d) 170 (N.S.S.C. (T.D.))
(search warrant for computerized hospital records); R. v. Cardoza, [1981] O.J. No. 3258, 61 C.C.C.
(2d) 412 (Ont. Co. Ct.) (search of computerized telephone records).
3
See generally Viktor Mayer-Schonberger & Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution
That Will Transform How We Live, Work, and Think (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013),
at 9 (noting that stored information grows four times faster than the world economy, and computer
processing power nine times faster).
4
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
5
See, e.g., Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, “Police Confirm Canadians’ Top Five
Fears about Lawful Access” (October 26, 2012), online: <http://www.cacp.ca/media/news/
download/1363/Final_CACP_Press_Release_-_Lawful_Access.pdf>; Department of Justice Canada,
1
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yearn for restoration, but they claim digitization has been a boon for state
surveillance and demand legislation and court rulings forestalling Big
Brother’s advance.6
The aim of this paper is not to resolve this debate. Indeed, given
people’s divergent interests7 and dispositions,8 “privacy versus security”
is likely to be a perpetually polarizing dialectic. But a narrower question
might be resolved: does digitization require a fundamental conceptual
overhaul of section 8 doctrine, or is that doctrine reasonably well
equipped to accommodate the digital revolution?
I favour the latter response. There is little reason to think that
digitization requires a radical reinterpretation of section 8.9 Technological
change inevitably influences constitutional interpretation and application.10
But for the most part, the foundation set out by the Supreme Court of
Canada in digital (and other) section 8 cases over the past two decades
provides the conceptual and doctrinal tools needed to achieve reasonable

“Summary of Submissions to the Lawful Access Consultation” (April 28, 2003), at 11-19, online:
<http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cons/la-al/sum-res/sum-res.pdf>; Susan Landau, Surveillance or Security?:
The Risks Posed by New Wiretapping Technologies (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), at 7.
6
See, e.g., Kevin Haggerty, “Methodology as a Knife Fight: The Process, Politics and
Paradox of Evaluating Surveillance” (2009) 17 Crit. Criminol. 277; Jena McGill & Ian Kerr,
“Reduction to Absurdity: Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and the Need for Digital
Enlightenment” (2012) Digital Enlightenment Yearbook 199.
7
See generally Meredith Kapushion, “Hungry, Hungry HIPPA: When Privacy Regulations
Go Too Far” (2003) 31 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1483, at 1491: “Consumers have wildly divergent
preferences based on their individual needs and tempered by the costs they are willing to bear.”
8
See generally Darhl M. Pedersen & Shelia Frances, “Regional Differences in Privacy
Preferences” (1990) 66 Psych Reports 731 (reviewing psychological literature finding marked
differences in privacy preferences depending on numerous personal characteristics and situational
factors); Ponnurangam Kumaraguru & Lorrie Faith Cranor, “Privacy Indexes: A Survey of Westin’s
Studies” (2005) Carnegie Mellon University, Institute for Software Research International, online:
<http://reports-archive.adm.cs.cmu.edu/anon/isri2005/CMU-ISRI-05-138.pdf> (finding shifting
proportions of U.S. population characterized as “privacy fundamentalists” (approximately onequarter to one-third), “privacy pragmatists” (over one-half), and “privacy unconcerned” (around onetenth)). As mentioned infra note 127, however, empirical researchers have found that people’s
survey-expressed privacy preferences are often belied by their observed behaviours.
9
For commentary taking a more radical approach, see, e.g., Matthew Johnson, “Privacy in
the Balance: Novel Search Technologies, Reasonable Expectations, and Recalibrating Section 8”
(2012) Crim. L.Q. 442; Jane Bailey, “Framed by Section 8: Constitutional Protection of Privacy in
Canada” (2008) Can. J. Crim. & Crim. Jus. 279; Lisa M. Austin, “Information Sharing and the
‘Reasonable’ Ambiguities of Section 8 of the Charter” (2007) 57 U.T.L.J. 499.
10
See generally Lawrence H. Tribe, “The Constitution in Cyberspace: Law and Liberty
Beyond the Electronic Frontier” in David M. Kaplan, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of Technology,
2d ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009) 309; Thomas Fetzer & Christopher S. Yoo, “New
Technologies and Constitutional Law” in Mark Tushnet, Thomas Fleiner & Cheryl Saunders, eds.,
Routledge Handbook of Constitutional Law (New York: Routledge, 2013) 485.
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accommodations between competing privacy and law enforcement
interests in the digital era.
The remainder of the paper consists of five parts. I begin with a brief
overview of the basic elements of section 8 law. Next, I chronologically
survey the Supreme Court’s existing “digital section 8” jurisprudence;
that is, each decision that has addressed allegations that the state has
violated section 8 in a digital realm. The third part distils three key
doctrines from these cases that are likely to animate future digital section
8 decisions: (i) the notion that “computers are different”; (ii) the role of
contract, statute, and other exogenous norms in shaping privacy
expectations over information obtained or held by third parties; and (iii)
the application of the “biographical core” test to “low resolution” private
information. While there is consensus as to the core meanings of each of
these doctrines, to varying degrees each suffers from indeterminacy in
application. I therefore propose refinements to minimize that
indeterminacy. The fourth part examines, from both descriptive and
prescriptive perspectives, how these doctrines played out in the Court’s
most recent digital section 8 decision: R. v. Spencer.11 As always, the final
part concludes.

II. SECTION 8 IN A NUTSHELL
Section 8’s basic interpretive architecture is well settled. To establish
a violation, claimants must demonstrate: first, that a governmental act
constituted a “search or seizure”; and second, that the search or seizure
was “unreasonable”.12
The “search or seizure” question reduces to whether the act intruded
on the claimant’s “reasonable expectation of privacy”.13 If not, there was
no “search or seizure” and no violation of section 8.14 Accordingly,

11
[2011] S.J. No. 729, 2011 SKCA 144 (Sask. C.A.) [hereinafter “Spencer”], affd [2014]
S.C.J. No. 43, 2014 SCC 43 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Spencer SCC”].
12
See generally Steven Penney, Vincenzo Rondinelli & James Stribopoulos, Criminal
Procedure in Canada (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2011), at para. 3.25 [hereinafter “Penney,
Rondinelli & Stribopoulos”].
13
Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 159 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, at 426 (S.C.C.) hereinafter “Dyment”].
14
See R. v. Evans, [1996] S.C.J. No. 1, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 8, at para. 11 (S.C.C.), per Sopinka J.
[hereinafter “Evans”]; R. v. Wise, [1992] S.C.J. No. 16, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527, at 533 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Wise”]; R. v. M. (A.), [2008] S.C.J. No. 19, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 569, at para. 8 (S.C.C.), per
Binnie J. [hereinafter “A.M.”].
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absent any limits imposed by statute or other Charter provisions, the
investigative technique comprising the act may be used without legal
restriction, assuming similar factual circumstances.15
If, in contrast, the technique does invade a reasonable expectation of
privacy, courts can regulate its use under section 8. Specifically, to be
considered a “reasonable” search, courts may demand that the state actor
conducting it meet certain conditions, such as obtaining a warrant based
on probable grounds.16 At a minimum, intrusions on reasonable
expectations of privacy must be “authorized by law”; in other words,
police must have a specific power to use the technique granted to them
by legislation or common law.17

III. THE JURISPRUDENCE
1. R. v. Plant
The first digital search case to reach the Supreme Court of Canada
was R. v. Plant, decided in 1993.18 Police received an anonymous tip that
a residence was being used to grow marijuana. Acting under a preexisting arrangement with the local electricity provider, they accessed its
customer database and discovered that the home was using four times
more electricity than others of its size. Armed with this and other
incriminating information, they obtained a warrant to search the home
and seized marijuana.
The homeowner argued that by obtaining his electrical consumption
records, police invaded his reasonable expectation of privacy without legal
authority and therefore violated section 8 of the Charter. The Court
disagreed, holding that the information obtained was not sufficiently

15
See generally, R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 42 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Duarte”]; R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36, at 47 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Gomboc, [2010] S.C.J. No. 55, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 211, at para. 20 (S.C.C.), per Deschamps J.
16
I use the “probable grounds” as shorthand for the standard that courts and legislatures
have termed “reasonable and probable grounds” or “reasonable grounds”. In some cases courts have
permitted searches on the basis of a lower standard termed “reasonable suspicion”. See Penney,
Rondinelli & Stribopoulos, supra, note 12, at paras. 3.132-3.140.
17
See R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, at 278 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Caslake, [1998] S.C.J. No. 3, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51, at paras. 10-12 (S.C.C.); R. v. Cole, [2012] S.C.J.
No. 53, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34, at para. 64 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cole”].
18
[1993] S.C.J. No. 97, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Plant”].
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“personal and confidential” to attract a reasonable expectation of privacy.19
Writing for the (6:1) majority, Sopinka J. elaborated as follows:
In fostering the underlying values of dignity, integrity and autonomy, it
is fitting that s. 8 of the Charter should seek to protect a biographical
core of personal information which individuals in a free and democratic
society would wish to maintain and control from dissemination to the
state. This would include information which tends to reveal intimate
details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual.
The computer records investigated in the case at bar while revealing the
pattern of electricity consumption in the residence cannot reasonably be
said to reveal intimate details of the appellant’s life since electricity
consumption reveals very little about the personal lifestyle or private
decisions of the occupant of the residence.20

Justice Sopinka further noted that the relationship between Mr. Plant
and the provider was not confidential, the records were kept for the
utility’s own commercial purposes, and there were no contractual terms
prohibiting disclosure to police.21 To obtain the information, he added,
police did not have to intrude “into places ordinarily considered private”.22
In her concurring opinion, McLachlin J. (as she then was) would
have held that the records did attract a reasonable expectation of
privacy.23 For her, the records told much about “one’s personal lifestyle,
such as how many people lived in the house and what sort of activities
were probably taking place there”, including the fact that marijuana was
being grown.24 She also took issue with Sopinka J.’s conclusion that the
search was non-intrusive. “Computers may contain a wealth of personal
information,” she argued, and the information they store “may be as
private as any found in a dwelling house or hotel room.”25 Lastly, she
downplayed the importance of the lack of any contractual prohibition on
disclosure, stating that “the question is not so much whether the
relationship is one of confidence, so much as whether the particular
records disclose a reasonable expectation of confidence”.26

19

Id., at 293.
Id., at 293-94.
21
Id., at 294.
22
Id.
23
Justice McLachlin concurred in the result because she found that there was sufficient
evidence, apart from the electricity records, to support the issuance of the warrant. Id., at 304.
24
Id., at 302-303.
25
Id., at 303-304.
26
Id., at 303.
20
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2. R. v. Morelli
Apart from one very brief affirming decision,27 the next section 8
digital privacy case did not arise until 2010, when the Court released
R. v. Morelli.28 The key issue there (whether police had sufficient grounds
to obtain a warrant to search a suspect’s personal computer for child
pornography) is not relevant to this paper. It was not disputed that the
suspect had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer’s
contents.29 By 2010, it would have been shocking had even one judge
concluded otherwise.30
The Court’s divergent pronouncements about the consequences of
digitization, however, are revealing. At the beginning of his majority
reasons, Fish J. signalled that the Court was cognizant of the especial
importance of privacy in the digital age:
It is difficult to imagine a search more intrusive, extensive, or invasive
of one’s privacy than the search and seizure of a personal computer.
First, police officers enter your home, take possession of your computer,
and carry it off for examination in a place unknown and inaccessible to
you. There, without supervision or constraint, they scour the entire contents
of your hard drive: your emails sent and received; accompanying
attachments; your personal notes and correspondence; your meetings and
appointments; your medical and financial records; and all other saved
documents that you have downloaded, copied, scanned, or created. The
police scrutinize as well the electronic roadmap of your cybernetic

27
Smith v. Canada (Attorney General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 85, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 902 (S.C.C.),
affg [2000] F.C.J. No. 174, 252 N.R. 172 (F.C.A.), affg CUB-44824 (UIC Umpire) (reasonable
expectation of privacy not breached when government unemployment insurance commission
obtained claimant’s travel records from customs agency through “data-match” program).
28
[2010] S.C.J. No. 8, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morelli”].
29
Because the issue was not in dispute, the Court did not explicitly state that personal
computers carried a reasonable expectation of privacy. But as the Court stated in Cole, supra, note
17, at para. 1, Morelli “left no doubt” on the issue.
30
Recall that in her concurring reasons in Plant, supra, note 18, at 303-304, McLachlin J.
observed that computers may contain a great deal of personal information. Note as well that the
Court has repeatedly referred to a 1972 government report on computer privacy. See Task Force on
Privacy and Computers, Privacy and Computers: A Report of a Task Force Established Jointly by
Dept. of Communications/Dept. of Justice (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1972); R. v. Lyons, [1984]
S.C.J. No. 63, [1984] 2 S.C.R 633, at 688 (S.C.C.); Dyment, supra, note 13, at paras. 19, 21, 29;
Plant, id., at 292; R. v. Law, [2002] S.C.J. No. 10, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 227, at para. 16 (S.C.C.);
R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, at para. 23 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Tessling”]; Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. United Food and Commercial
Workers, Local 401, [2013] S.C.J. No. 62, 2013 SCC 62, at para. 21 (S.C.C.).
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peregrinations, where you have been and what you appear to have seen on
the Internet — generally by design, but sometimes by accident.31

Justice Deschamps’ dissenting opinion also began with a comment
on the “tremendous changes” wrought by “[i]nternet and computer
technologies”.32 But, rather than stressing digitization’s threat to privacy,
she emphasized its capacity to “facilitate the communication of
information and the exchange of material of all kinds and forms, with
both legal and illegal content, and in infinite quantities.”33 “No one can
be unaware today”, she added, “that these technologies have accelerated
the proliferation of child pornography because they make it easier to
produce, distribute and access material in partial anonymity”.34
3. R. v. Gomboc
Also decided in 2010, R. v. Gomboc35 was the sequel to Plant. As in
Plant, police suspected that a home was being used as a grow-op and
wished to measure its electricity consumption. But, instead of obtaining
billing records from the provider, they asked it to install a digital
recording ammeter (“DRA”) on the power line connected to the house.
The provider complied, placing the DRA outside the home’s property
line. Compared to the billing records in Plant, the DRA provided more
detailed, hourly usage data that enabled police to make stronger
correlations with the cyclical usage patterns typical of grow-ops.36
A majority of the Court found that the DRA did not invade the
homeowner’s reasonable expectation of privacy. It divided, however, on
the reasons for this conclusion. For the plurality, Deschamps J. held that
the case could not be distinguished from Plant. Though the DRA
produced more fine-grained measurements, it did not reveal intimate
details of household activities.37 The fact that the information came from

31

Morelli, supra, note 28, at paras. 2-3.
Id., at para. 114.
Id.
34
Id. (internal citation omitted).
35
[2010] S.C.J. No. 55, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 211 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gomboc”].
36
Id., at paras. 5, 38. The officer who testified about DRAs stated that of approximately 400
cases where DRA data was used to obtain a search warrant, grow-op evidence was found in all but
one. Id., at para. 69, Abella J., concurring. DRAs can also provide accurate consumption information
when conventional metering has been manipulated to thwart criminal investigation and defraud the
provider. See, e.g., R. v. Cheung, [2005] S.J. No. 474, 2005 SKQB 283, at para. 6 (Sask. Q.B.).
37
Gomboc, supra, note 35, at paras. 7-15, 36-40.
32
33
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a home (normally a realm of strong privacy expectation38) did not trump
this fact.39 In her view, the evidence established that “there was
absolutely no reliable inference to be made concerning the occupants or
their activities in the house besides the grow operation”.40 And while the
criminal nature of concealed activity does in itself disqualify it from
section 8’s protections, she stressed, the focus of the inquiry is not the
“nature or identity of the concealed items” but rather the “potential
impact of the search on the person [or thing] being searched”.41
Further, she noted, police access to electrical consumption data was
permitted by the governing legislative regime. The relevant regulation
allowed disclosure of customer information to police absent the
customer’s express request that it remain confidential (which the
homeowner did not make).42 Though this legislation was not “sufficient
to erode the expectation of privacy”, she concluded, it “weighed heavily
against giving the asserted expectation of privacy constitutional
recognition”.43 She was careful to state, however, that given the great
diversity of information “generated in customer relationships” and given
that such relationships “are often governed by contracts of adhesion”,
courts should exercise caution in deciding the constitutional effect of
legislative disclosure clauses.44
Justice Abella agreed that there was no reasonable expectation of
privacy. But she would have found otherwise but for the disclosure
clause.45 For her, any information from “inside the home” is
“presumptively” protected by a reasonable expectation of privacy.46 The
fact that the information reliably predicted the presence of a grow-op was
enough to demonstrate the DRA’s invasiveness.47 She took an even
stronger view than Deschamps J., however, on the Regulation’s effect on
38
Id., at para. 45. See also Evans, supra, note 14; R. v. Silveira, [1995] S.C.J. No. 38,
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 297 (S.C.C.); R. v. Feeney, [1997] S.C.J. No. 49, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13
(S.C.C.);Tessling, supra, note 30; R. v. Patrick, [2009] S.C.J. No. 17, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 579 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Patrick”].
39
Gomboc, id., at para. 50.
40
Id., at para. 7.
41
Id., at para. 39, quoting Patrick, supra, note 38, at para. 32.
42
Code of Conduct Regulation, Alta. Reg. 160/2003, s. 10(3)(f): permitting disclosure of
customer information “to a peace officer for the purpose of investigating an offence if the disclosure
is not contrary to the express request of the customer”.
43
Gomboc, supra, note 35, at paras. 32-33.
44
Id., at para. 33.
45
Id., at paras. 82-95.
46
Id., at para. 80.
47
Id., at para. 81.
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the homeowner’s expectation of privacy. Because he had an “unrestricted
ability” to control the release of information,48 she concluded, any
subjective expectation of privacy he may have had was not objectively
reasonable.49
Having dissented in Plant, it is not surprising that McLachlin C.J.C.
did the same in Gomboc. Writing with Fish J., she agreed with Abella J.’s
assessment of the DRA’s invasiveness.50 In addition to reliably revealing
the presence of a grow-up,51 they asserted, it enabled predictions about
other “probable activities taking place within a home”,52 including
“whether anyone is home, the approximate time at which the occupants
go to bed and wake up, and guesses as to particular appliances being
used”.53 A surveillance technique need not be capable of making
“conclusive determinations” of residential activity to trigger a reasonable
expectation of privacy, they reasoned.54 It is enough that it enables
“informed predictions” conveying “useful private information to the
police”.55 Unlike Abella J., however, they concluded that legislation did
not extinguish the homeowner’s reasonable expectation of privacy.56
A reasonable person could not have been expected to know that the
legislation existed, let alone that it would be interpreted to permit the
release of detailed electrical consumption data.57
4. R. v. Cole
The Court’s next digital section 8 decision was 2012’s R. v. Cole.58
There, it had to decide whether a teacher had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a computer issued to him by his employer. While conducting
routine maintenance, a school technician discovered nude photographs of
a student on the computer. The technician notified the principal, who
instructed him to make copies of the photos. The principal seized the
48

Id., at para. 85.
Id., at para. 95.
50
Id., at paras. 105, 124, 129.
51
Id., at para. 129.
52
Id., at para. 128.
53
Id.
54
Id., at para. 125.
55
Id., at para. 124 (emphasis in original).
56
Id., at paras. 138-142.
57
Id., at paras. 139-140. See also Lisa Austin, “Getting Past Privacy? Surveillance, the
Charter, and the Rule of Law” (2012) 27 Can. J.L. & Soc’y 381, at 394.
58
Supra, note 17.
49
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computer, school board technicians made copies of temporary Internet
files found on it, and both the computer and the copied files were sent to
the police. Police examined the material and conducted a further forensic
search of the computer.
Writing for a unanimous Court on this issue, Fish J. noted that the
robust expectation of privacy ordinarily attaching to computer data was
tempered by a number of factors, including the board’s announced
ownership of the device and its contents, the teacher’s lack of exclusive
access or control, the school’s publicized policy of monitoring usage, and
its explicit warning that computer data was not private.59
The Court nonetheless concluded that the teacher maintained a
reasonable expectation of privacy. That expectation did not prevent his
employer from either inspecting the computer in the course of routine
maintenance or, once the photographs were found, searching it for school
safety reasons.60 But it did require police to obtain a warrant before
examining the computer and its data. Despite its ownership, policies, and
warnings, Fish J. observed, the school allowed the teacher to use the
computer for “personal purposes”.61 “[R]egardless of where they are
found or to whom they belong”, he continued, computers “used for
personal purposes” reveal intimate information about financial, medical,
and personal matters as well as people’s “specific interests, likes, and
propensities”.62 This is especially true, he wrote, of devices connected to
the Internet.63
5. R. v. Vu
Most recently, the Court issued its decision in R. v. Vu.64 There, it had
to decide whether police could search computers and a cell phone found
by police searching a residence under a warrant authorizing, among other
things, a search for documents. Though the warrant did not specifically
authorize any computer searches,65 under conventional law this would
not have been a problem. Warrants to search places (such as residences)

59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id., at paras. 8, 15-17, 50, 55-56.
Id., at paras. 61-62.
Id., at para. 54.
Id., at para. 47, quoting in part Morelli, supra, note 28, at para. 105.
Id.
[2013] S.C.J. No. 60, 2013 SCC 60 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Vu”].
Id., at para. 4.
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for things (such as documents) do not normally need to specify the
location or container in which those things may be found.66
The Court concluded, however, that computers and mobile phones67
were not analogous to “cupboards or filing cabinets”.68 Highlighting
contemporary computers’ massive storage capacities and the great
diversity of intimate information they contain, Cromwell J. held for a
unanimous Court that section 8’s reasonableness requirement mandates
specific, prior authorization to search computers.69 If police find a
computer (presumably in plain view70) while executing a warrant without
such an authorization, they may seize it if they reasonably believe it
contains evidence related to an offence.71 But they may not search it
unless they first obtain a specific warrant to do so.72
The Court was not willing, however, to proclaim a general rule
requiring issuing judges to impose conditions dictating how computer
searches should be conducted to limit unnecessary privacy invasions. 73
Requiring such conditions, Cromwell J. reasoned, would “likely add
significant complexity and practical difficulty”. 74 Claimants can
challenge the reasonableness of computer searches ex post, however,
and the rules emerging from these decisions may guide police on how
to limit searches in future cases. 75 After-the-fact review, he added, may
also spur future courts to develop rules constraining computer searches
ex ante.76 Lastly, given the complexity of the issue and the rapid rate of

66

Id., at paras. 23, 39.
Notably, the Court concluded that contemporary mobile phones were equivalent to
computers in terms of their storage and other capacities. All references to computers were thus
specifically defined to include mobile phones. Id., at para. 38.
68
Id., at para. 24.
69
Id., at paras. 40-48.
70
On the requirements of plain view seizures, see Penney, Rondinelli & Stribopoulos,
supra, note 12, at paras. 3.220-3.227.
71
Vu, supra, note 64, at para. 49.
72
Id.
73
Id., at paras. 53-62.
74
Id., at paras. 57-58 (noting the difficulty that U.S. courts have had in developing a
consensus on how computer searches should be restrained ex ante).
75
Id., at para. 55.
76
Id. Given that the Court was itself unwilling to proclaim any such rules, this statement is
somewhat perplexing. Perhaps it is best understood as expressing an unwillingness, given the
evidence on the record, to impose general, ex ante rules at the present time. But Cromwell J. did
appear to contemplate the gradual imposition of such rules over time. See id., at para. 62: “I would
not foreclose the possibility that our developing understanding of computer searches and changes in
technology may make it appropriate to impose search protocols in a broader range of cases in the
future. Without expressing any firm opinion on these points, it is conceivable that proceeding in this
67

516

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d)

technological innovation, he suggested that Parliament might wish to
intervene to tackle the issue “more comprehensively”. 77

IV. KEY DOCTRINES
Three key doctrines can be discerned in the cases that are likely to
provide the foundation for future digital privacy decisions.
1. Computers Are Different
The first and most elemental doctrine, illustrated by Morelli and Vu,
is that computers are “different”; in other words, the capacities of digital
devices differ, often by several orders of magnitude, from their nondigital counterparts.78 Simply put, computers typically contain both a
vastly greater quantity and a vastly greater variety of personal
information than their analogue counterparts. For example, digital
devices often contain extensive records of communications content (text
messages, e-mail and the like). Though non-digital “information
containers” (such as briefcases, filing cabinets and notebooks) may
contain personal communications (such as letters, calendars, and diary
entries), the volume and diversity of information they hold is in no way
comparable to that found on digital devices.79 Indeed, the magnitude of
communications content that may be extracted from digital devices may
in some cases exceed that obtained through prospective communications

way may be appropriate in some circumstances.” Note, as well, that issuing judges are required to
impose conditions on the execution of searches on a case-by-case basis when necessary to ensure
reasonableness under s. 8. See generally Baron v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 6, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 416
(S.C.C.); Descôteaux v. Mierzwinski, [1982] S.C.J. No. 43, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 860 (S.C.C.). Alluding
to this requirement, Cromwell J. suggested in Vu that in some cases “authorizing justices may find it
practical to impose conditions when police first request authorization to search. In others, they might
prefer a two-stage approach where they would first issue a warrant authorizing the seizure of a
computer and then have police return for an additional authorization to search the seized device.” Id.,
at para. 62.
77
Vu, id., at para. 56.
78
See Daniel M. Scanlan, “Issues in Digital Evidence and Privacy: Enhanced Expectations
of Privacy and Appellate Lag Times” (2012) 16 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 301, at 307-308 [hereinafter
“Scanlan”].
79
Id., at 308. See also R. v. Fearon, [2013] O.J. No. 704, 2013 ONCA 106, at para. 61
(Ont. C.A.), appeal heard and reserved May 23, 2014, [2013] S.C.C.A. No. 141 (S.C.C.): observing
that mobile phones are “sophisticated devices which have a capacity for storing an infinite variety
and amount of personal information in which there is a high expectation of privacy by the owner”.
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surveillance (i.e., wiretaps),80 which can only be conducted under
onerous conditions exceeding those applicable to “ordinary” search
warrants.81
That said, as discussed below in relation to the Spencer case, it can be
dangerous to ascribe capacities to digital search technologies that they do
not in fact possess. Judges must strive to understand the actual capacities
of the privacy-invasive technologies before them, not speculative or
theoretical capacities stemming from hype, misinformation or fear.82
2. Third Party Information and Extrinsic Norms
The starting point for this doctrine, exemplified by Plant and
Gomboc, is the principle that reasonable privacy expectations may
survive the disclosure of personal information to third parties. For those
steeped in section 8 law, this proposition is neither novel nor
controversial. But it is far from self-evident. In the United States, the socalled “third party doctrine” dictates that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily or necessarily given to
others, regardless of its inherent sensitivity or any conditions on
disclosure imposed or expected by the subject.83 As a consequence, vast
troves of personal information (increasingly held in searchable, digital
form) receive no constitutional protection.84
Presciently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected this doctrine at an
early stage of its section 8 jurisprudence. In Plant, Sopinka and
80

See Scanlan, id., at 308.
Criminal Code, Part VI. See generally Steven Penney, “Updating Canada’s
Communications Surveillance Laws: Privacy and Security in the Digital Age” (2008) 12 Can. Crim.
L. Rev. 115, at 118-21.
82
See generally Paul Ohm, “The Myth of the Superuser: Fear, Risk, and Harm Online”
(2008) U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1327 (experts in digital and Internet technology often exaggerate risks of
harm). See also Timothy Caulfield, “Biotechnology and the Popular Press: Hype and the Selling of
Sciences” (2004) 22 Trends in Biotechnology 337 (exploring legal implications of media-generated
hype surrounding genetic technologies).
83
See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (banking records); Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735 (1979) (telephone records). See also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)
(plurality) (no expectation of privacy when defendant communicates with informant surreptitiously
carrying a “wire” transmitting conversations to police). Recently, however, some members of the
Court have questioned the wisdom of retaining this doctrine in the digital era. See United States v.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 949 (2012), Sotomayor J.
84
See Christopher Slobogin, Privacy at Risk: The New Government Surveillance and the
Fourth Amendment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), at 151-64; Susan W. Brenner &
Leo L. Clarke, “Fourth Amendment Protection for Shared Privacy Rights in Stored Transactional
Data” (2006) 14 J.L. & Pol’y 211.
81
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McLachlin JJ. both quoted from Dyment,85 where La Forest J. opined that
that “situations abound where the reasonable expectations of the individual
that the information shall remain confidential to the persons to whom, and
restricted to the purposes for which it is divulged, must be protected”.86 In
other words, though a person may impart confidential information to
another for particular, instrumental reasons, the state should not be wholly
free to conscript that information for its own purposes.87
This principle becomes especially important as more and more
personal information is digitized, recorded, and stored in myriad
searchable databases. Without some assurance that at least some of this
information is protected from disclosure to government, people may lose
trust in institutions and relationships, refrain from socially beneficial (but
potentially stigmatizing) communications or activities, or deploy
wasteful non-legal mechanisms to protect their privacy.88
But while a third party’s possession of personal information does not
preclude Charter protection, the nature of the relationship between the
parties (including any governing contractual or legislative norms) may
diminish or even extinguish privacy expectations. In Plant, for example,
Sopinka J. noted that the commercial nature of the data and the lack of
contractual terms restricting disclosure militated against section 8
protection.89 Likewise in Gomboc, Abella J. (and to a lesser extent
Deschamps J.) pointed to the legislative default disclosure rule in
concluding that the claimant’s expectation of privacy was unreasonable.
In Cole, in contrast, the Court held that given the sensitivity of the
85

Dyment, supra, note 13, at 429-30.
See generally Duarte, supra, note 15 (reasonable expectation that private conversations
not intercepted or recorded by state, even if one party aware of surveillance); Cole, supra, note 17, at
paras. 67-73.
87
See Dyment, supra, note 13, at 431-32 (reasonable expectation of privacy retained for bodily
samples taken by medical personnel); R. v. Colarusso, [1994] S.C.J. No. 2, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 20, at para.
70 (S.C.C.) (blood samples held by coroner); R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R.
411, at para. 99 (S.C.C.) (records held by counsellors); Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney
General); White, Ottenheimer & Baker v. Canada (Attorney General); R. v. Fink, [2002] S.C.J. No. 61,
[2002] 3 S.C.R. 209, at para. 35 (S.C.C.) (records held by lawyers); R. v. Dersch, [1993] S.C.J. No. 116,
[1993] 3 S.C.R. 768, at 778 (S.C.C.) (records held by physicians).
88
See Dyment, supra, note 13, at 433-34. For more detailed versions of this argument, see
Steven Penney, “Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Novel Search Technologies: An Economic
Approach” (2007) 97 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 477 [hereinafter “Penney, ‘Novel Search
Technologies’”]; Steven Penney, “Conceptions of Privacy: A Comment on R. v. Kang-Brown and
R. v. A.M.” (2008) 46 Alta. L. Rev. 203; Tracey M. Bailey & Steven Penney, “Healing not Squealing:
Recent Amendments to Alberta’s Health Information Act” (2007) 15 Health L. Rev. 3, at 8 [hereinafter
“Bailey & Penney”].
89
Supra, note 18.
86
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information at issue and the school board’s acquiescence to personal use
of its computers, the board’s ownership and regulation of the claimant’s
computer data did not wholly defeat his privacy interest.90
Though these cases can be distinguished from one another, an
emerging consensus can be distilled. To begin, section 8 sets out
normative limitations on state power; its scope cannot therefore be
(entirely) dictated by exogenous norms like statute or contract. As
Deschamps J. put it in Gomboc:
[T]he fact that the person claiming an expectation of privacy in
information ought to have known that the terms governing the
relationship with the holder of that information allowed disclosure may
not be determinative. Rather, the appropriate question is whether the
information is the sort that society accepts should remain out of
the state’s hands because of what it reveals about the person involved,
the reasons why it was collected, and the circumstances in which it was
intended to be used.91

Second, statute and contract are less likely to extinguish expectations
of privacy over information that is intrinsically intimate. As McLachlin
C.J.C. and Fish J. stated in Gomboc, “legislation is only one factor that is
to be considered when determining whether an expectation of privacy is
objectively reasonable and it may be insufficient to negate an expectation
of privacy that is otherwise particularly compelling”.92
This is a sensible approach. Consider the consequences of failing to
recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in Cole. Employer-issued
digital devices have become ubiquitous, and employees commonly use
them for personal purposes. Unrestricted state access to data from such
devices could have many pernicious consequences, such as dissuading

90

Supra, note 17.
Gomboc, supra, note 35, at para. 34. See also Tessling, supra, note 30, at para. 42:
“Expectation of privacy is a normative rather than a descriptive standard”; Patrick, supra, note 38, at
para. 14; R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36, at 46 (S.C.C.): the fundamental
question in s. 8 cases is “whether giving their sanction to the particular form of unauthorized
surveillance in question would see the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens
diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society”; Anthony
Amsterdam, “Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment” (1974) 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, at 402.
92
Gomboc, id., at para. 115. Of course, legislative provisions permitting such disclosures
are themselves subject to scrutiny under s. 8. See generally, id., at para. 58, per Deschamps J.
(noting that the legislation was not subject to a Charter challenge); Royal Bank v. Welton, [2009]
O.J. No. 209, 306 D.L.R. (4th) 487 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 111
(S.C.C.) (rejecting s. 8, Charter challenge of disclosure exceptions in private sector privacy
legislation).
91
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people from engaging in socially productive and personally fulfilling
communications and activities and inducing them to adopt costly and
wasteful measures to preserve their privacy.93
Equally important, the costs to law enforcement of recognizing a
reasonable expectation of privacy in workplace devices are marginal. As
the Court noted in Cole, employers retain considerable scope to monitor
devices and investigate work-related wrongdoing.94 When such
monitoring or investigation uncovers clear evidence of criminal activity,
police will normally have little trouble obtaining a warrant to seize this
evidence or conduct further searches.
3. The Biographical Core Test and “Low Resolution” Information
This still leaves the question of how to judge whether information is
so intrinsically intimate as to be presumptively deserving of
constitutional protection. As discussed, in Plant, the Court set out the
“biographical core” test to answer this question. Like so many broadly
stated, pragmatically grounded legal standards, the test works well in
most situations. Everyone would agree that information about people’s
sexual, religious and political preferences95 is more deserving of
protection than information about their allegiances to sports teams. Nor
would many dispute that (all other things being equal) information about
residential activity is more intimate than behaviour conducted in public
spaces, like driving or shopping.96
But as Plant and Gomboc illustrate, jurists often disagree about how
to characterize investigative techniques that reveal “low resolution”
information. Standing alone, such information may reveal little about
intimate activity. But by viewing it in conjunction with other data, police
may be able to determine (or at least infer the existence of) more

93
See Steven Penney, “Unreasonable Search and Seizure and Section 8 of the Charter:
Cost-benefit Analysis in Constitutional Interpretation” in Errol Mendes & Stéphane Beaulac, eds.,
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 5th ed. (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2013) 751,
at 755-57 [hereinafter “Penney, ‘Cost-benefit’”].
94
The Court declined to comment on the implications of its decision for the rights of
employers to monitor computers issued to employees. Cole, supra, note 17, at para. 60.
95
See Patrick, supra, note 38, at para. 30, per Binnie J. and at para. 76, per Abella J.,
concurring; Gomboc, supra, note 35, at para. 7, Deschamps J. and at para. 121, McLachlin C.J.C.
and Fish J., dissenting.
96
See, e.g., Wise, supra, note 14 (weaker expectation of privacy in vehicles than residences).
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sensitive behaviour.97 The debate over this kind of information centres on
two related points: (i) the nature of the probabilistic inferences that can
be drawn from the information (i.e., whether police can infer the
presence of intimate activity with reasonable reliability); and (ii) the
relative merits of brighter or dimmer lines demarcating protected from
unprotected information (e.g., whether all information about residential
activity should be protected, even if it does not permit reliable inferences
in the case at hand).98
Elsewhere, I have argued how these debates should have been
resolved in Plant, Gomboc and other existing Supreme Court decisions.99
Below, I discuss on how they played out in Spencer.

V. R. V. SPENCER: IS THERE A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY IN SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION?
1. Background
The issue in Spencer100 was whether the “subscriber” information
associated with electronic communications attracts a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Police often need this information to obtain
warrants to acquire electronic communications content or metadata.101
As in many of the cases on this question, in Spencer, police
determined that someone using a particular Internet Protocol (“IP”)
address was trading child pornography online. Using a publicly available
database, they traced the address to Shaw Communications, a major
Internet service provider.102 Police wrote to Shaw requesting the identity
of the subscriber associated with that address, purportedly in accordance
with section 7(3)(c.1)(ii) of the Personal Information Protection and

97
See generally Orin S. Kerr, “The Mosiac Theory of the Fourth Amendment” (2012) 110
Mich. L. Rev. 311. For non-digital Supreme Court cases wrestling with this issue, see Tessling,
supra, note 30. See also Penney, “Cost-benefit”, supra, note 93, at 762-67.
98
See also Tessling, supra, note 30, at para. 34.
99
Penney, “Cost-benefit”, supra, note 93.
100
Supra, note 11.
101
See Robert W. Hubbard, Susan Magotiaux & Xenia Proestos, “The Limits of Privacy:
Police Access to Subscriber Information in Canada” (2002) 46 Crim. L.Q. 361, at 372-73
[hereinafter “Hubbard, Magotiaux & Proestos”].
102
See also R. v. Ward, [2012] O.J. No. 4587, 2012 ONCA 660, at paras. 25-26 (Ont. C.A.)
[hereinafter “Ward”].
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Electronic Documents Act.103 As have most providers in similar
circumstances,104 Shaw complied, disclosing the name and billing
information of the appellant’s sister. After using this information to
obtain a search warrant, police discovered an extensive cache of child
pornography on the appellant’s computer. The appellant asserted that the
warrantless disclosure of the subscriber information violated section 8 of
the Charter. The Crown countered, and the trial court agreed, that the
disclosure was not a search or seizure because the subscriber information
did not attract a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Reflecting the divisions about this question in other courts,105 in
Spencer, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal divided in three ways.106
S.C. 2000, c. 5 [hereinafter “PIPEDA”] (stating that organizations may disclose personal
information without consent if police have identified their “lawful authority to obtain the
information and indicated that … the disclosure is requested for the purpose of enforcing any law of
Canada …”). Some jurists have interpreted “lawful authority” as requiring police to have a warrant
or other compulsive process to obtain personal information under this provision. See, e.g., Re C. (S.),
[2006] O.J. No. 3754, 2006 ONCJ 343 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. Mahmood, [2008] O.J. No. 3922, 236 C.C.C.
(3d) 3 (Ont. S.C.J.). Most courts have rightly rejected this argument, noting (among other things)
that such an interpretation would make s. 7(3)(c) of the Act (which permits disclosure when
compelled by subpoena, warrant or court order) redundant. See, e.g., R. v. Kwok, [2008] O.J. No.
2414, at para. 32 (Ont. C.J.) [hereinafter “Kwok”]; R. v. Brousseau, [2010] O.J. No. 5793, 2010
ONSC 6753, at paras. 41-45 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. McNeice, [2010] B.C.J. No. 2131, 2010 BCSC 1544,
at para. 43 (B.C.S.C.); R. v. Trapp, [2012] S.J. No. 778, [2012] 4 W.W.R. 648, at paras. 114-118
(Sask. C.A.), per Ottenbreit J.A. [hereinafter “Trapp”]. See also Suzanne Morin, “Updated: Business
Disclosure of Personal Information to Law Enforcement Agencies: PIPEDA and the CNA Letter of
Request Protocol”, Privacy Pages: CBA National and Privacy Access Law Section Newsletter
(November 2011), at 3-8, online: <http://www.cba.org/cba/newsletters-sections/pdf/2011-11privacy1.pdf> [hereinafter “Morin”] (examining provision’s legislative history).
104
See Morin, id.; Ward, supra, note 102, at paras. 37-38; Andrea Slane, “Privacy and Civic
Duty in R. v. Ward: The Right to Online Anonymity and the Charter-Compliant Scope of Voluntary
Cooperation with Police Requests” (2013) 39 Queen’s L.J. 301, at 303.
105
To date, the only other provincial court of appeal to deal with the issue has been
Ontario’s, which ruled in Ward, id., that the subscriber information associated with an IP address did
not attract a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances. Trial courts have split on the
question, with most finding no expectation of privacy. For a sample of decisions finding no
expectation of privacy in IP subscriber information, see R. v. Friers, [2008] O.J. No. 5646, 2008
ONCJ 740 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. Wilson, [2009] O.J. No. 1067 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. McGarvie, [2009] O.J.
No. 6417 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. McNeice, [2010] B.C.J. No. 2131, 2010 BCSC 1544 (B.C.S.C.);
R. v. Brousseau, [2010] O.J. No. 5793, 2010 ONSC 6753 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Vasic, [2009] O.J. No. 1968
(Ont. S.C.J.). Decisions going the other way include R. v. Cuttell, [2009] O.J. No. 4053, 2009 ONCJ
471 (Ont. C.J.); Kwok, supra, note 103; and Re C. (S.), supra, note 103. For decisions on other types
of subscriber information, see, e.g., R. v. Hutchings, [1996] B.C.J. No. 3060, 111 C.C.C. (3d) 215, at
paras. 22-26 (B.C.C.A.) (declining to find a reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone numbers,
but noting that there was no evidence that the suspect’s number was unlisted); R. v. Brown, [2000]
O.J. No. 1177, at para. 63 (Ont. S.C.J.) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in mobile phone
subscriber records); R. v. Pervez, [2005] A.J. No. 708 (Alta. C.A.) (same); R. v. Stucky, [2006] O.J.
No. 108, [2006] O.T.C. 30 (Ont. S.C.J.) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in identifying
103
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Justices Caldwell and Cameron agreed that because of its potential to
reveal detailed and intimate information about lifestyle and personal
choices, subscriber information generally attracts a reasonable
expectation of privacy.107 But Caldwell J.A. (and not Cameron J.A.)
found that this expectation was extinguished by Shaw’s service
agreements and privacy policy, which warn customers that Shaw may
disclose personal information to law enforcement.108 Justice Cameron
would have found that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy,
but held in any event that the disclosure was reasonable under
section 487.014(1) of the Criminal Code.109 Justice Ottenbreit, in
contrast, rejected the notion that subscriber information was sufficiently
intimate or revealing to attract a reasonable expectation of privacy. “The
potential that the Disclosed Information might in this case eventually
reveal much about the individual and the individual’s activity ...”, he
reasoned, is “neither here nor there”.110
The Supreme Court concluded that the subscriber information
attracted a reasonable expectation of privacy, that statute and contract did

information of postal box customer); R. v. James, [2013] O.J. No. 3591 (Ont. S.C.J.) (no reasonable
expectation of privacy in name and account number associated with suspicious financial transactions);
R. v. Siemens, [2011] S.J. No. 406 (Sask. Prov. Ct.) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in name of
driver who rented car). American courts have almost universally rejected the notion that there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy in Internet subscriber information. See, e.g., United States v.
Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, at 1204-1205 (10th Cir. Kan. 2008); United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161,
at 164-65 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, at 842-43 (8th Cir. Neb. 2009).
106
Supra, note 11. At the same that it decided Spencer, the Court released its decision in
Trapp, supra, note 103, in which a differently constituted court split two ways in a similar case. As
in Spencer, Cameron J.A. (Jackson J.A., concurring) held that the accused had a reasonable
expectation of privacy but that the search was reasonable. The remaining judge in Trapp, Ottenbreit J.A.,
concluded as he did in Spencer that there was no such expectation.
107
Spencer, id., at paras. 22-27, Caldwell J.A., para. 98, Cameron J.A. Justice Caldwell also
noted at paras. 34-42 that disclosure was permitted under PIPEDA.
108
Id.
109
This conclusion, which Cameron J.A. elaborated more fully in Trapp, supra, note 103,
is clearly incorrect and was rejected by the Supreme Court in Spencer, id., at paras. 71-73.
Section 487.014(1) simply states that, “[f]or greater certainty,” police do not require a production
order to “ask a person to voluntarily provide to the officer documents, data or information that the
person is not prohibited by law from disclosing.” Since the provision does not create a police power
to obtain the data (but merely confirms the general principle that police may seek people’s voluntary
cooperation to obtain investigative information), and since it imposes no limits on police’s ability to
do so, it cannot be said to authorize the disclosure. So, if the information obtained attracted a
reasonable expectation of privacy (and thus constituted a “search or seizure”), its disclosure to police
was not authorized by law and accordingly cannot be “reasonable” under s. 8. See also Ward, supra,
note 102, at para. 50: “With respect to the contrary opinion reached by the majority in Trapp, at
para. 66, I do not read s. 487.014(1) as creating or extending any police search or seizure power.”
110
Spencer, id., at para. 110 (emphasis in original).
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not extinguish this expectation, and that the police’s acquisition of the
information was unreasonable under section 8 because it was not
authorized by law. Though the appeal was dismissed (because the Court
ruled that the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2) of the
Charter), henceforth police will not be able to obtain subscriber
information by request from service providers.
Spencer implicates each of the three digital section 8 doctrines
discussed above: (1) the technological nature of the investigative
technique; (2) the effect of contract and statute in shaping reasonable
privacy expectations; and (3) the application of the “biographical core”
test to a type of information that some consider highly intimate and
others not. In the context of subscriber information requests, (1) is so
intimately related to (3) that I discuss them together. I therefore begin
with (2).
2. Contract and Statute
Echoing Deschamps J.’s view in Gomboc, Cromwell J. held for a
unanimous Court that contractual and statutory norms “may be relevant
to, but not necessarily determinative of whether there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy”.111 Indeed, in Spencer he found that these norms
had little value in determining the reasonableness of the appellant’s
expectation of privacy.112 The relevant contractual provisions were
“confusing and equivocal”, he wrote, and the statutory framework was
“not much more illuminating”.113 Ultimately, he concluded that by
incorporating PIPEDA by reference, the contractual framework
permitted non-consensual disclosures only when authorized by law,
which simply begs the question of whether a police request for voluntary
disclosure invades a reasonable expectation of privacy under section 8 of
the Charter.114 In this case at least, contract and statute led to a
tautology.115

111

Spencer SCC, supra, note 11, at para. 54.
Id., at para. 55: “[T]he relevant provisions provide little assistance in evaluating the
reasonableness of Mr. Spencer’s expectation of privacy.”
113
Id., at para. 60.
114
Id., at para. 65: “The overall impression created by these terms is that disclosure at the
request of the police would be made only where required or permitted by law.”
115
See id., at para. 63 (characterizing the relevant PIPEDA provisions (discussed further,
infra, at notes 117-120 and accompanying text) as involving an “essential circularity”).
112
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The Court’s reluctance to put much weight on either statutory or
contractual norms in deciding whether there was a reasonable expectation of
privacy in subscriber information was amply warranted. Consider first the
statutory context. As mentioned, PIPEDA permits (but does not require) the
organizations it governs to disclose personal information to police for law
enforcement purposes. Both Caldwell J.A. in Spencer116 and Doherty J.A. in
Ward117 found this to militate against finding a reasonable expectation of
privacy. As discussed, however, section 8 guarantees a realm of privacy
protection as against the state irrespective of state efforts to circumscribe
privacy.118 It is difficult to reconcile this “normative” conception of section 8
with one that permits privacy expectations to be diminished by statute.
It also makes little sense to read PIPEDA, which was designed to
enhance individual privacy vis-à-vis non-state entities, as restricting
individual privacy vis-à-vis the state.119 Before PIPEDA and its provincial
counterparts were enacted, police were free to request personal information
from third parties, and absent legal process compelling disclosure (like a
warrant), third parties were generally free to decide whether to comply.
PIPEDA has not changed this. The law enforcement exemptions in
PIPEDA and its analogues should not therefore be interpreted as militating
either for or against recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy.120
Contract presents a somewhat more difficult case. As noted by Doherty
J.A. in Ward, to the extent that service agreements and privacy policies are
binding, they are paradigmatically contracts of adhesion.121 There is
considerable diversity among providers and their privacy policies. But given
the dominant market share of the largest few;122 the uniformity of terms;123

116
117
118

Id., at para. 41.
Ward, supra, note 102, at paras. 100-104.
See discussion supra, note 91 and accompanying text See also Spencer, supra, note 11, at

para. 18.
See contra Teresa Scassa, “Information Privacy in Public Space: Location Data, Data
Protection and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” (2010) 7 Can. J. Law & Tech. 193, at 205
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and the length, complexity, and frequent amendment of those terms,124 it is
questionable whether consumers have much bargaining power with respect
to their privacy.125
On the other hand, if consumers really do value the privacy of their
subscriber information, the market would arguably respond
accordingly.126 On this view, the fact that the big providers permit
disclosure speaks to the low value customers actually place on this aspect
of their privacy.127 Assuming a competitive marketplace and a reasonable
measure of information symmetry,128 consumers’ acquiescence with these
terms could plausibly count against recognizing a reasonable expectation
of privacy in subscriber information.129
It is not clear which of these arguments is stronger. In the face of this
uncertainty, the most sensible position may be to consider contractual
terms, but be cautious before giving them much weight, especially when
the information obtained is unequivocally intimate.130 But in cases where
the information is not especially sensitive (or is only debatably so),
contractual terms clearly limiting privacy expectations may help sway the
balance against section 8 protection, absent evidence of market failure.
3. Subscriber Information and the Biographical Core
Given the ambiguity and circularity of the statutory and contractual
framework, the most critical determinant in Spencer was the Court’s
gc.ca/eng/publications/reports/policymonitoring/2013/cmr5.htm> (the top five major Internet Service
Providers captured 76 per cent of the market in 2012).
123
See Morin, supra, note 103, at 16-17 (compiling cases where courts have concluded that
providers’ customer agreements permit non-consensual disclosure of customer information to law
enforcement) and 18-19 (finding such disclosure permitted under contemporary agreements).
124
See Scassa, supra, note 119, at 211.
125
See Ward, supra, note 102, at para. 106.
126
See Adam Thierer, “A Framework for Benefit-cost Analysis in Digital Privacy Debates”
(2013) Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1055, at 1071-76 [hereinafter “Thierer”].
127
See Alessandro Acquisti, “The Economics of Personal Data and the Economics of Privacy: 30
Years after the OECD Privacy Guidelines”, Paper #3 (December 2010) Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, online: <http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/46968784.pdf> (surveying
research showing willingness to disclose sensitive information for small rewards); Bettina Berendt, Oliver
Günther and Sarah Spiekermann, “Privacy in e-commerce: Stated preferences vs. actual behavior” (2005)
48 Communications of the ACM 101 (experiment revealing divergence between privacy preferences and
behaviour); Evelien van de Garde-Perik et al., “Investigating Privacy Attitudes and Behavior in Relation to
Personalization” (2008) 26 Social Sci. Computer Rev. 20, at 35-36, 39 (same).
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measurement of the intrinsic intimacy of subscriber information, i.e.,
whether it comprises part of the “biographical core” typically protected
by section 8 of the Charter. On the face of it, it is difficult to see how a
customer’s name, address, or other identifying information (such as a
telephone number, e-mail address or username) would reveal intimate
details of people’s lifestyles or personal choices, even if the information
is not publicly available.131 But police obviously did not want the
subscriber information for its own sake. Rather, they wanted it to help
discover the identity of the person downloading child pornography.132
The question then is whether piercing an Internet user’s anonymity in
these circumstances presents such a risk to privacy as to demand
constitutional protection. The courts and commentators who have answered
“yes” to this question have offered two major arguments. The first is that
the particular information obtained by police, i.e., the (likely) identity of a
person observed to have accessed child pornography, revealed “intimate
details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual”.133 The
argument, in other words, is that use of child pornography is itself protected
information, because it is an activity typically conducted in secrecy that
people would not wish others to know about. The fact that possession and
distribution of child pornography are criminal offences is immaterial: the
activity is (almost by definition) intimate, so it deserves protection.
Perhaps surprisingly, the Supreme Court of Canada has sustained this
argument, albeit in less emotionally fraught circumstances than child
pornography.134 As I have argued more extensively elsewhere, however, this
principle is dubious.135 There is an argument that courts should sometimes
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L.Q. 486, at 500-503.
133
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See Penney, “Novel Search Technologies”, supra, note 88; Penney “Cost-benefit”, supra,
note 93, at 806-807.
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use procedural law (like privacy rights) to constrain the enforcement of
arguably unwise substantive offences.136 But given the Supreme Court’s
pronouncements about the evils of child pornography offences (including
simple possession),137 this argument did not seem tenable in Spencer, and
indeed, the Court did not advert to it.138 Put bluntly, it sounds (and is in fact)
perverse to interpret section 8 to protect subscriber information to preserve
people’s liberty to trade child pornography anonymously.
The second argument is more viable and was the one endorsed by the
Court in Spencer. By obtaining Mr. Spencer’s subscriber information,
Cromwell J. suggested, police could potentially observe his online
activity in a more sustained and general way. Though he was far from
precise in detailing the nature of this potential surveillance, Cromwell J.
concluded that any request for subscriber information that corresponds to
“specifically observed, anonymous Internet activity engages a high level
of informational privacy”.139
Justice Cromwell is far from alone in fearing that subscriber
information may give police access to reams of intimate information
beyond the discovery of criminal activity. Many other jurists have made
the same claim.140 If this is true, unregulated police access to subscriber
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Consultation Document: Response of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada to Public
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information could indeed cause many of the privacy harms discussed
above. But it is far from evident that this is correct. The evidence in
Spencer and Ward, for example, showed that the subscriber information
only allowed police to connect online activity with a likely user for brief,
discrete periods of time.141 This linking gave police access very little
additional information about that person’s online activities.
Commentators have nevertheless suggested that subscriber
information gives police the capacity to scour the Internet for detailed
records of subscribers’ online activities. 142 There is no evidence in
the jurisprudence, however, that police have done this or have the
ability to do so.143 As the cases illustrate, when police discover child
pornography trading online, they can easily determine both the IP
addresses of the traders and the service providers who assigned those
addresses. But even assuming that an IP address remains attached to a
particular subscriber for a significant period of time, 144 there is no ready
means of searching the Internet for any other activity associated with
that address.
The strongest argument that can be made for protecting subscriber
information under section 8, then, is that it may be theoretically possible
to use that information to engage in broader, unregulated surveillance of
the subscriber’s (undeniably intimate) online activities.145 Since this
possibility represents such a grave threat to privacy, the argument runs,
courts should impose a bright line rule prohibiting unregulated access to
subscriber information despite the fact that the information revealed in
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the Internet.”
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the actual cases before them is mundane. Though not stated explicitly,
this appears to be the rationale behind the Court’s decision in Spencer.
The Court had previously rejected this kind of argument, however, in
what is still the leading decision on the reasonable expectation of privacy
question: R. v. Tessling. As Binnie J. stressed for a unanimous Court
there, “the reasonableness line has to be determined by looking at the
information generated by existing … technology, and then evaluating its
impact on a reasonable privacy interest”.146 If the technology at issue
changes, he added, “courts will have to deal with its privacy implications
at that time in light of the facts as they then exist”.147
Justice Binnie’s reluctance to extrapolate from demonstrated existing
technical capacity in Tessling was wise. As many commentators have
noted, appellate courts are generally unsuited to the task of regulating
complex and rapidly shifting technologies.148 They deal with only that
tiny fraction of uses of a technology that have been litigated to appeal
(often years after the technology has been superseded); hear only the
voices of advocates (including any interveners); and are largely limited
to the evidentiary record developed at trial, with only very restricted
capacities to engage with independent, technical expertise.149
All of this suggests that the Supreme Court may have been too eager
to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in Spencer, especially if
doing so would mean that police would need warrants to obtain
subscriber information (even on reasonable suspicion). While police may
have grounds to obtain such warrants in many cases (including on the
facts of Spencer), in many others they may not. Police often need to
obtain subscriber information attaching to computer modems/routers,
mobile phones and other digital devices at very early stages of an
investigation to develop leads, rule out suspects, ensure public safety and
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develop grounds to obtain search warrants or wiretap authorizations.150
A warrant requirement would impede these efforts with little countervailing
benefit to people’s privacy.
Failing to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in Spencer,
moreover, would not likely have opened the door to broader and more
intrusive surveillance. First, section 8 of the Charter would likely apply
to any governmental efforts to use subscriber information to
systematically track online activities or conduct data mining with respect
to identifiable persons.151 As discussed, in Spencer and analogous cases
police did not use subscriber information for these purposes. If
reasonable privacy expectations are invaded by the state’s acquisition of
any information that might later be used for intrusive surveillance,
almost any inquiry would trigger section 8 protection, severely
hampering law enforcement.152
Second, if there is a need for systematic, prospective regulation of state
access to subscriber records, Parliament is well placed to intervene.
Compared to courts, legislatures are more directly responsive to people’s
preferences and can seek input from a much greater range of sources,
including law enforcement, industry, advocacy groups, academics, technical
experts and the general public.153 And though the legislative process may
sometimes be skewed (on the one hand, by the outsized influence of wellorganized and deep-pocketed lobbies; and on the other, by the discounted
influence of unpopular minorities),154 there is little evidence that such bias
has worked against the protection of online privacy.
150
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151
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Rosalind Dixon, “The Supreme Court of Canada, Charter Dialogue, and Deference” (2009) 47 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 235, at 257-66 [hereinafter “Dixon”]; Thomas W. Merrill, “Does Public Choice Theory Justify
Judicial Activism After All?” (1997) 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 219; Michael J. Klarman, “The
Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory” (1991) 77 Va. L. Rev. 747, at 763-68; Cass
R. Sunstein, ed., Behavioral Law and Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000);

532

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Many commentators have argued that legislatures protect the privacy
and liberty interests of criminal suspects, who are disproportionately
poor, mentally ill and members of racial minorities.155 Courts may
therefore be justified in using expansive constitutional interpretations to
regulate police-citizen encounters,156 especially the kinds of recurring,
street-level interactions empirically associated with discriminatory
profiling and other abuses.157 But when a surveillance technology is
perceived to threaten the privacy of broad or powerful segments of
society, legislatures have often been responsive.158 This is almost
certainly the case with requests for subscriber information and many
other Internet-related investigative tools. In recent years, the federal
government (under both Liberal and Conservative regimes) has proposed
several Bills that would have enhanced law enforcement’s abilities to
obtain information from the digital realm, including provisions to compel
the production of subscriber information.159 In each case vigorous
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lobbying by privacy groups helped to kill the proposals.160 There does
not seem to be a need, therefore, for courts to constitutionalize protection
for subscriber information to correct defects in the majoritarian political
process.
Thankfully, however, the Spencer Court did not foreclose the
possibility of a legislative response that could restore law enforcement’s
capacity to obtain subscriber information without a warrant. Recall that
to cohere with section 8, any intrusion on a reasonable privacy
expectation (i.e., a “search or seizure”) must be “authorized” by statute
or at common law. Since there was no statutory or common law authority
to obtain the subscriber information in Spencer, the Court simply
concluded that the search was not authorized by law and hence was
unreasonable.161 This leaves room for a “dialogical” response by
Parliament that would regulate warrantless access to subscriber
information.162 The lawful access Bills mentioned above, for example,
included audit, usage, reporting and record-keeping requirements that
would have greatly limited the possibility of racial profiling163 or
systematic data mining.164

VI. CONCLUSION
The digital age is upon us, and the law of search and seizure and
section 8 of the Charter must inevitably adapt. But meeting this challenge
should not require a dramatic overhaul of the Supreme Court of Canada’s
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existing digital section 8 jurisprudence. The Court has already
recognized the distinctiveness of digital devices, stressed the importance
of maintaining privacy in third party records, and exhibited a reluctance
to erode the normative core of section 8 by reference to extrinsic norms.
In future cases, however, it is hoped that in refining the meaning of
“biographical core” information, the Court will rethink its position on the
protection of purely criminal information, focus on the actual (and not
speculative) capacities of digital search and surveillance technologies,
and be cognizant of its own informational limitations in seeking to
regulate complex and changing technologies.

